When Clausewitz said that ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means’, he established a simple yet profound criterion: the value of an army can only be measured by the political results it achieves. Applying this criterion to Israel’s modern military history reveals a recurring pattern from 1967 to the present. Israel has achieved overwhelming tactical superiority in almost every conflict it has engaged in, yet has consistently struggled to convert this into lasting political outcomes. From the Six-Day War to the Lebanon War, and from the Gaza operations to the 12-Day War in June 2025, this pattern has remained unchanged: military successes have invariably been followed by strategic uncertainty.

The joint U.S.–Israeli attack on Iran added a new dimension to this pattern. The issue is no longer merely Israel’s inability to translate its tactical successes into strategic victory. The real problem is that the same logic has drawn the US into the conflict and undermined Washington’s global strategic position.

Historical pattern: Brilliant tactics, vague strategies

Israel’s history of being caught between tactical victory and strategic deadlock spans more than half a century. Although the 1967 Six-Day War saw Israel defeat the armies of Egypt, Jordan and Syria, capturing the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights and Sinai, it is difficult to argue that these territories became any kind of strategic objective for Israel, except for Sinai. This uncertainty has resulted in a 57-year-long occupation that has become Israel’s most fundamental political problem.

In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon and succeeded in driving the PLO out of Beirut and into Tunisia. However, the territory vacated by the PLO was subsequently occupied by Hezbollah, which was supported by 1,500 Iranian Revolutionary Guard trainers. By solving one problem, Israel created a much stronger enemy.

During the 2006 war with Hezbollah, Israel destroyed most of the Zelzal missiles within the first 39 minutes and killed thousands of Hezbollah fighters. Nevertheless, Hezbollah continued to fire approximately 4,000 rockets into northern Israel for 34 days. The harsh criticism of the Winograd Commission acknowledges that tactical superiority did not translate into strategic results. This cycle repeated itself every few years in Gaza. Each operation inflicted heavy losses on Hamas, yet the organisation always recovered.

The same pattern was repeated in the 12-day war with Iran in June 2025. Israel dealt serious blows to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and conventional capabilities, and the U.S. participated in the operation by attacking nuclear facilities. Both countries had hoped that the military coup would spark an anti-regime uprising, but this expectation went unfulfilled. While the tactical victory was resounding, none of the declared strategic objectives were achieved.

28 February 2026: Repetition of the pattern, expansion of scale

In a video message posted on Truth Social following the attack, former U.S. President Donald Trump outlined the objectives of the operation: the destruction of Iran’s missile and military capabilities, the elimination of its navy, the termination of its nuclear program and a change of regime. He addressed the Iranian people, saying: “Your country will be yours.” Each objective must be evaluated on its own merits.

In terms of military capacity, the initial results of the operation were devastating. Around 40 senior officials, including Khamenei, were killed, and the command and control structure was seriously damaged. However, within four hours, Iran launched a comprehensive retaliation, targeting Israel and U.S. assets in six Gulf countries with ballistic missiles and UAVs. The fact that a state said to have been ‘destroyed’ was able to launch a simultaneous attack on seven countries within hours demonstrates how baseless this claim is.

The situation is much more problematic with regard to nuclear capabilities. Just two days before the attack, on 26 February, following the third round of indirect negotiations in Geneva, Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi announced ‘groundbreaking’ progress. Iran had reportedly agreed to stop stockpiling enriched uranium and grant full access to IAEA inspectors, and a comprehensive agreement was anticipated within three months. Launching a military operation at a time when a diplomatic solution was so close may have strengthened Iran’s determination to develop nuclear weapons rather than resolving the nuclear issue.

As for the goal of regime change, there has never been a case in history where a government has been overthrown by air power alone. While the images of people celebrating Khamenei’s death in the streets are real, Iran is not Iraq in 2003. Constitutional backup mechanisms have been activated, the security forces have responded to the celebrations with gunfire, and the state structure has not collapsed.

The strategic erosion of the United States

The main issue addressed in this article is not the extent of the damage caused by Iran, but rather how the United States will emerge from this operation. Israel’s tactic-focused logic is causing strategic erosion for the United States in at least six areas.

Firstly, there is the issue of diplomatic credibility. The US resorted to military action just as indirect negotiations conducted through Oman had reached what Busaidi called ‘the point of agreement’. Resorting to force when concrete progress was being made at the negotiating table will seriously undermine any future state’s willingness to trust Washington in negotiations.

Secondly, there is the erosion of the allied structure. The UK’s position is a striking example of this dynamic. On 28 February, Prime Minister Starmer said that ‘the UK played no role in these attacks’; however, the landing of Iranian missiles a few hundred meters from the British base in Bahrain and the firing of two missiles towards Cyprus caused him to radically change his position within 48 hours. On 1 March, Starmer announced that he had authorized the US to use British bases for defensive purposes, revealing that British jets had intercepted Iranian missiles. Although he stated that ‘we will not repeat the mistakes of Iraq’, Britain is effectively being drawn into the conflict. Gulf countries are in an even more critical position. Although they are not parties to the war, they have become targets for Iran. Paradoxically, this situation could isolate the US rather than Iran, as confidence in Washington is rapidly eroding in Gulf capitals.

Thirdly, the deterrence paradox. Since 2003, the US has accumulated an image of being a ‘power that fails to achieve its declared goals’ in the Middle East. Although it succeeded in effecting regime change in Iraq, the ensuing chaos has lasted for decades. In Afghanistan, after 20 years, it handed the country over to the Taliban and withdrew. Now, regime change has been declared the goal in Iran. If this goal is not achieved, the US’s deterrence capital will be further eroded. If it is achieved, it will only be through air power, which has never happened before.

Strait of Hormuz ‘effectively closed’.

Fourthly, there is the economic cost to consider. Iran declared that the Strait of Hormuz was ‘effectively closed’. Although the Strait has not been completely closed, major oil companies have suspended shipments and tankers have changed course. Disruption to this narrow strait, through which approximately 20 million barrels of crude oil per day — one-fifth of the global supply — pass, has led to sharp price increases in the markets. The issue that is most sensitive to Trump’s own voter base is the cost of living, and the Iran operation directly triggers this sensitivity.

Fifthly, capacity disclosure. Every large-scale operation reveals U.S. military architecture, intelligence methods, signals intelligence capabilities and targeting doctrine. Since the Iraq War of 2003, Beijing and Moscow have carefully studied every U.S. operation and adapted their own defence planning accordingly. It is clear, therefore, how important a source of data this operation is for China’s regional and global military planning.

Sixthly, the transfer of legitimacy. While the U.S. and Israel may believe that killing Khamenei would destroy the symbolic centre of the regime, they overlook the most fundamental principle of Shia political theology. At the heart of Shia collective memory lies the Karbala paradigm. According to this, the ‘innocent and oppressed’ imam is martyred by the ‘oppressor’. This narrative has shaped social memory for 1,400 years, and eleven of the twelve Imams are remembered as ‘oppressed martyrs’.

Khamenei’s assassination by an enemy attack, especially during Ramadan, would fit this ancient paradigm perfectly without the regime’s propaganda apparatus needing to invent anything. Indeed, Iran’s modern history confirms this pattern. For example, Prime Minister Mossadegh, who was overthrown in a CIA-MI6-backed coup in 1953, was a secular nationalist with no ideological affinity to Khamenei. Yet his overthrow by foreign intervention transformed him into an inexhaustible source of ‘victimhood capital’ in Iran’s collective memory. This capital came into play 26 years later, providing legitimacy to the 1979 Revolution. While Washington may believe that removing Khamenei would pave the way for regime change, the possibility that it would create a martyred leader symbolising resistance against imperialism is at least as likely.

This article was originally published on March 17, 2026, in Politics Today