The connection between the Hashd al‑Sha’abi and the outbreak of the anti-government protests in 2019 known as the Tishreen (October) protest movement uprising is often overlooked due to the presupposed distinctions between both events.

French ambitions in Iraq present various indicators towards a geopolitical balance of power and economic gains.

The re-appointment of Mohammed al-Halboosi as Iraq’s Speaker of Parliament reflects an early future of a consensus agreement between the Sadrists, Taqadum-Azam Sunni alliance, and the Kurdish alliance.

The divided Gulf region is witnessing new shifts in its approaches towards Türkiye and Iran with the emergence of post-COVID-19 economic implications and a weaker US military presence.

The target of the violent protesters and attackers is not focused on PM al-Kadhimi per se, but to conduct a wider attempt to ensure survival and continuous power.

Despite the different stances towards the electoral boycott, Iraq’s Tishreen (October) protest movement is what determines Iraq’s political future and not the early elections.

Despite the distance, Iraq is not far from Afghanistan’s spillover effects.

Biden’s announcement to withdraw US troops from Iraq is contrary to the on-ground reality.

Despite Iran’s significant influence in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, Ebrahim Raisi will offer a limited difference in the foreign policy that is heavily dominated and controlled by the IRGC.

The recent events in Karbala might arguably transform the city’s protest movement to lead the popular campaign against the upcoming early elections.

Is the ‘unruly militias’ narrative a new challenge or justification?