Iran’s forward defense doctrine,  a central pillar of its military strategy, has evolved significantly since its inception during the Iran-Iraq War. Initially shaped by the lessons of that conflict, it gained coherence in the early 2000s and has been fully operationalized since 2016. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in a 2019 speech, articulated its core principle: “We must not limit ourselves within our own borders. It is our duty to recognize and confront threats that lie beyond our walls.”

While typically associated with proxy networks, Quds Force operations, and cross-border intelligence activities, Iran’s forward defense now integrates cyber warfare, ballistic missile and drone capabilities, and naval expansion. In the wake of logistical setbacks along the Lebanon-Syria corridor, Tehran has redirected its strategic focus toward the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman, and the North Indian Ocean. Since 2020, Iranian media has intensified its coverage of naval power, signaling a shift in Iran’s geopolitical priorities.

Iran is increasingly looking to the seas as a strategic lever to navigate economic challenges, bolster security, circumvent sanctions, and enhance its geopolitical standing. This maritime shift has even sparked debate over relocating the capital to the southern Makran region, though such discussions remain largely conceptual rather than concrete policy initiatives.

At the same time, Iran’s proxy networks across the region have weakened. Events over the past year have eroded their deterrent effect, with some factions questioning Iran’s reliability, particularly after Tehran’s inaction on Hezbollah. Additionally, internal security challenges – including the Mahsa Amini protests, targeted assassinations, the suspicious death of President Ebrahim Raisi on May 19, 2024, and the assassination of Hamas Political Bureau Chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31– have forced Iran to prioritize domestic stability while adopting a more flexible foreign policy posture.

This heightened threat perception is evident in near-weekly military exercises. Yet, despite this emphasis on defense, official rhetoric remains focused on internal socio-political concerns. Until Raisi’s death, Iranian media’s coverage of domestic economic issues was secondary to its focus on the so-called “resistance front.”

Iran’s setbacks in Syria have profoundly reshaped its strategic thinking. In the aftermath of December 8, Iranian media intensified a Neo-Safavid discourse, seeking to differentiate between “Anatolian Turks” and “Iranian Turks” as a means of countering Turkey’s expanding regional influence. This historical narrative, drawing parallels between the Battle of Chaldiran and Karbala, aims to erect an ideological buffer against Ankara’s growing presence in Syria. Iranian media outlets have increasingly framed Turkish-Syrian relations through a lens of historical tension, reinforcing a narrative of divergence.

Meanwhile, Tehran has pursued active regional diplomacy, securing a strategic agreement with Russia on January 17 and fast-tracking negotiations with Afghanistan while maintaining a pragmatic stance in discussions with the West. Domestically, the Masoud Pezeshkian administration has prioritized development-oriented policies, while the military has focused on strengthening coastal defense and naval operations –all reinforcing the strategic significance of Iran’s southern coastline.

Iran’s “long arm” (dast-e boland) strategy, which gained momentum after developments in Syria, is a key component of its forward defense doctrine. Personally endorsed by Khamenei, this strategy is spearheaded by Rear Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri, Commander of the IRGC Naval Forces, and Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi, former Naval Forces Commander and current Deputy Commander of the IRGC. The doctrine seeks to extend Iran’s military reach beyond the Persian Gulf into open waters and strategic maritime zones.

The strategic line Iran aims to establish under its forward defense doctrine

The strategy is underpinned by several key objectives:

1. Projecting Iranian military power beyond territorial waters, ensuring a persistent naval presence in open seas and oceans.
2. Preparing for a worst-case scenario, particularly the prospect of a coalition attack –a concern that has driven Iran’s “mosaic defense” and asymmetric warfare doctrines since the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.
3. Establishing preemptive defense capabilities, enabling Iran to intercept potential threats in open waters before they reach its shores.

Iran has expanded its naval footprint in the Indian Ocean and increased patrol operations in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The IRGC navy’s permanent deployment plan, activated in 2020, aims to establish an enduring presence near key maritime chokepoints. Tehran has also developed long-range naval capabilities, deploying warships like Shahid Roudaki, capable of carrying helicopters and missile systems. Notably, Iran’s “long arm” strategy spans a vast geographic expanse, encompassing the heartlands of the Middle East –including the Levant, Mesopotamia, and the Arabian Peninsula– while extending its maritime reach into the Indian Ocean’s strategic sea lanes.

Beyond its military dimensions, this strategy also encompasses economic and infrastructural ambitions, including energy transmission projects, tourism initiatives, and the development of new coastal cities. Nearly every Iranian ministry has integrated these objectives into national planning, while Tehran’s foreign policy establishment has sought to cultivate diplomatic partnerships with Oman, India, China, and Russia to facilitate these initiatives.

At present, Iran finds itself in a defensive posture, prioritizing internal security challenges over regional power projection. Rather than expending resources to reclaim lost influence in the region, Tehran is channeling its efforts toward domestic stabilization and coastal development. However, serious doubts remain about its ability to successfully implement its southern shore projects.

The governance crisis in Iran is a well-established structural issue, and investment in the southern coastline is not a new topic. These initiatives have been under discussion for over a decade, yet have failed to materialize. However, following Iran’s setbacks in Syria, strategic emphasis has shifted toward maritime expansion, signaling a recalibration of its geopolitical priorities.

While Iran frequently cites sanctions as the primary barrier, the challenges go beyond external constraints. Chronic institutional inefficiencies, factional rivalries, and a lack of foreign investor confidence have all played a role in hampering Iran’s economic integration. The failure of India's investment in Chabahar, coupled with China’s prioritization of Gwadar over Iranian ports, underscores Tehran’s difficulty in attracting large-scale commitments from its supposed partners.

Even within BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Iran remains on the periphery of global investment flows. Despite years of diplomatic overtures, Iran has failed to secure the scale of economic partnerships it seeks from Russia, China, or India.

Moreover, these investment figures pale in comparison to China’s commitments in Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, underscoring Iran’s struggles to attract large-scale foreign investment. India, in particular, remains wary of expanding its commercial footprint in Iran, largely due to previous setbacks, such as its experiences with the Farzad B gas and oil field. These challenges have eroded trust among Indian companies, making them hesitant to commit significant capital.

A striking example of this uncertain investment climate is the Zahedan Railway Project – originally a joint initiative with India but later announced as an Iranian-led effort. Nearly a decade later, the project remains incomplete.

A similar pattern has played out across numerous infrastructure projects, including the South Pars Natural Gas Expansion Project, the Jask Oil Terminal and Pipeline Project, and the Bandar Abbas-Bushehr Railway Project. Over time, investor confidence has eroded, leading to capital withdrawals and stalled developments, further highlighting Iran’s persistent difficulties in securing and sustaining foreign investment.

In a nutshell, Iran’s structural challenges run far deeper than external sanctions or investment shortfalls. Systemic inefficiencies—ranging from industrial projects driven by profiteering rather than productivity to water crises exacerbated by ill-conceived dam construction and chronic mismanagement in the energy sector—have long undermined the country’s economic trajectory.

Against this backdrop, the real question is not just whether Iran can attract foreign capital, but whether it possesses the political will and institutional capacity to execute such an expansive portfolio of projects simultaneously, or if these initiatives will once again remain confined to rhetoric rather than reality.