The Israeli airstrikes on Iran, launched on June 13, 2025, have reignited debate not only over the region’s volatile security architecture but also over the durability of Iran’s domestic political order. Central to this discussion is whether the significant losses sustained by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the broader Iranian armed forces might produce a power vacuum –one that could catalyze civil unrest and, potentially, regime change. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s direct public appeal to the Iranian people to rise up against the regime has added rhetorical weight to this scenario. Compounding the tension, Kurdish armed groups operating within Iran –PAK, PJAK, and the PDKI have issued parallel calls for regime change. Whether such a transformation is genuinely within reach, however, hinges on a sober assessment of Iran’s entrenched political, social, and security structures.

Can the Regime Protect Itself?

Assessing the prospects of a popular uprising in Iran requires a clear understanding of the regime’s internal security apparatus. Crucially, key structures such as the nationwide network of Basij militias have thus far remained untouched by Israeli strikes. This suggests that the regime’s core instruments of domestic control remain intact. The Basij’s decentralized, neighborhood-level mobilization, allows for early detection of dissent and rapid suppression of unrest. These mechanisms –which played decisive roles in quelling previous protest waves– remain the backbone of the regime’s ability to manage and neutralize internal threats.

Moreover, while Iran’s external defense capabilities may at times appear vulnerable, its apparatus for internal regime protection remains deeply entrenched and highly institutionalized. Over the course of more than four decades, Iran’s internal security agencies have accumulated considerable expertise in monitoring, managing, and suppressing dissent. Shaped by successive waves of domestic unrest since the 1979 Revolution, this apparatus has evolved into a sophisticated and adaptive system. The regime’s expansive surveillance network –anchored in multiple intelligence and security organizations– has significantly enhanced its ability to identify emerging threats at an early stage. Iran’s responses to major protest movements in 1999, 2009, 2017, and most recently in 2022, illustrate its capacity not only to withstand crises but also to reassert control through rapid mobilization and coercive consolidation.

Although previous uprisings in Iran have reflected deep-seated socio-economic grievances, none have risen to the level of a systemic threat capable of destabilizing the regime. On the contrary, in the aftermath of each wave of unrest, the state has often emerged more internally cohesive. This historical pattern offers important insights into how the regime might respond if the current crisis were to escalate into another round of popular mobilization. Periodic protests in Iran, while persistent, have tended to manifest as episodic flare-ups rather than existential challenges which underscore the enduring effectiveness of the regime’s internal security architecture. Against this backdrop, the likelihood that discontent stemming from the recent Israeli attacks could evolve into a coordinated, nationwide anti-regime movement appears minimal.

Does the Opposition Have a Leadership?

A major structural impediment to any uprising capable of threatening the regime at this stage is the absence of unified leadership among opposition forces. The diverse groups engaged in armed or nonviolent resistance against the Islamic Republic operate in fragmented silos, lacking both organizational coherence and a central, charismatic figure capable of rallying broad-based support –something that proved crucial during the 1979 Revolution. Today's opposition is marked by ideological and strategic disunity, and its activities remain largely localized and uncoordinated. This fragmentation severely limits the potential for disparate protests to coalesce into a cohesive, nationwide movement with the capacity to fundamentally challenge the regime’s hold on power.

How Does Iranian Society View the Crisis?

At the socio-psychological level, widespread fears of fragmentation and instability significantly constrain the space for large-scale anti-regime mobilization in Iran. In a country marked by ethnic and sectarian diversity, the prospect of a power vacuum triggering separatist movements –particularly among armed Kurdish, Baluch, and Arab groups– generates deep anxiety across broad segments of the population. These concerns are compounded by the cautionary examples of state collapse and civil strife in neighboring countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya, which have left a lasting impression on Iranian public opinion. As a result, even among citizens disillusioned with the current regime, the fear of national disintegration often outweighs the desire for radical political change. This collective mindset fosters a preference for stability over upheaval, dampening the likelihood of a unified, mass uprising.

The Reality Check

In conclusion, claims that Israel’s recent airstrikes have exposed serious vulnerabilities within the Iranian regime are overstated when viewed against the backdrop of Iran’s entrenched internal security structures, institutional resilience, and prevailing social psychology. At present, there is little evidence to suggest that the conditions necessary for a mass uprising capable of toppling the regime are in place. If anything, Israel’s external interventions appear to be reinforcing the regime’s internal cohesion and justifying heightened security measures. Under current circumstances, it is unlikely that Netanyahu’s strategy will succeed in catalyzing a movement sufficiently organized or widespread to bring about regime change in Iran.

In sum, those anticipating swift regime change in Iran are likely to be disappointed. The Islamic Republic’s survival machinery –refined over decades of internal unrest and external pressure– remains deeply entrenched and highly effective. As long as the opposition remains fragmented, leaderless, and unable to articulate a unifying alternative vision, the regime will continue to endure, weathering even the fiercest of storms.