Iraq’s parliamentary elections on November 11 will do more than shape the country’s domestic trajectory as they will also redefine regional power dynamics and test the outer limits of Iranian influence at a moment when Tehran can least afford additional setbacks. For Iran, which shares a 1,600-kilometer border with its western neighbor, these elections have evolved from a matter of political interest into a question of regional standing.

The strategic upheavals of the past year have profoundly reshaped Tehran’s regional assessments. The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria on December 8, 2024, combined with Hezbollah’s debilitating losses in Lebanon since October 7, has dismantled two of the principal pillars of Iran’s “axis of resistance”. As a result, Iraq has become indispensable to Tehran’s regional strategy. What was once a relationship grounded in sectarian affinity and ideological solidarity forged in the aftermath of the 2003 U.S. invasion has evolved into something far more urgent –a strategic lifeline for a regime confronting deepening regional marginalization.

Tehran’s recent diplomatic outreach underscores this strategic adjustment. Over the last weeks, high-level exchanges have intensified between the two countries. Ali Larijani, Secretary General of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, visited Baghdad in August, while Ammar al-Hakim, leader of Iraq’s National Wisdom Movement, and Qasim al-Araji, Iraq’s National Security Adviser, made reciprocal trips to Tehran in September and October respectively. The centrality of security coordination in these discussions makes clear where Iran’s priorities lie as Iraq approaches its parliamentary elections.

The Limits of Influence

Since the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, Tehran has adjusted its reliance on asymmetric instruments, adopting what might be described as a “quiet but persistent” strategy of influence preservation in Iraq. Yet this restrained posture –channeled primarily through the Hashd al-Shaabi paramilitary umbrella– now faces mounting U.S. counterpressure. Washington’s sustained campaign of disarmament and demobilization, targeting both Hezbollah and the Hashd, has proven remarkably effective in constraining Iran’s operational reach and eroding its deterrent credibility across the Levant and Mesopotamia.

The impact of Washington’s campaign became unmistakable in October 2025, when the Trump administration decided to impose sanctions on several Hashd al-Shaabi–affiliated factions, including the Nujaba Movement, Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigades, Ansarullah al-Awfiya Movement, and the Imam Ali Brigades –all designated by the United States as terrorist entities. This escalation followed the March introduction of the “Free Iraq from Iran Act” in the U.S. House of Representatives, which called for sweeping sanctions on Tehran’s proxy networks. Collectively, these measures delivered a direct blow to Iran’s principal instrument of influence in Iraq, severing international financial channels and eroding the domestic legitimacy that Tehran had spent years cultivating for these groups.

Washington’s strategy has yielded tangible results. The Iraqi Parliament withdrew draft legislation that would have granted formal legal status to components of the Hashd al-Shaabi, underscoring the growing deterrent power of U.S. sanctions. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s warning to the Shiite Coordination Framework that “devastating U.S. sanctions could cripple Iraq” laid bare Baghdad’s acute anxiety over the economic fallout of defying American pressure.

Compounding Tehran’s challenges is the looming possibility that Iraq could become a staging ground for Israeli or U.S. strikes against Iranian assets. To forestall this, the Quds Force has urged restraint among its Iraqi affiliates, warning that ill-timed attacks could trigger disproportionate retaliation. The eight visits to Iraq by Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani between September 2024 and September 2025 reflect the urgency of this message and the fragility of Tehran’s control over its network.

The recent allegations that Iraqi airspace was used to facilitate strikes on Iran during the June 2025 confrontation with Israel have only intensified Tehran’s unease. Iranian officials are almost certainly hoping that Iraq’s upcoming elections will produce a government capable and willing to deny its airspace to future attacks. Whether any Iraqi administration can assert such sovereignty, however, remains deeply uncertain.

A Subtler Hand

Faced with shifting political realities, Tehran has adapted its electoral strategy. Instead of the overt candidate engineering and visible political interference that characterized earlier Iraqi election cycles, Iran now pursues a more discreet and structured approach –one focused on cultivating and consolidating parliamentary blocs positioned to wield influence after the vote. Through Shiite formations such as the Fatah Alliance and the Coordination Framework, Tehran seeks to shape government formation indirectly while ensuring that its allies retain leverage over key decision-making arenas. Emphasis is placed on securing control of the Interior, Defense, and Energy ministries –portfolios that remain central to preserving Iran’s influence within Iraq’s security and economic architecture.

Yet this calibrated strategy faces formidable constraints. Iraqi public sentiment has grown increasingly attuned to issues of sovereignty –an evolution catalyzed by the October 2019 protest movement, which explicitly rejected foreign interference from all sides. Among younger Iraqis in particular, skepticism toward Iranian involvement has become a defining feature of political consciousness, eroding the social base that once lent Tehran-aligned factions electoral resilience. The rise of urban middle class, youth-driven reform movements, and technocratically oriented civil society actors –many of whom now hold seats in parliament– further complicates Iran’s capacity to exert influence through its traditional networks of patronage, clerical mediation, and security cooperation.

Economic leverage forms another pillar of Iran’s engagement with Iraq. Bilateral trade surpassed $10 billion in 2024, driven by Iranian natural-gas exports, electricity sales, and food commodities –sectors that have deepened a dense web of interdependence. Tehran has increasingly sought to weaponize this economic linkage, converting necessity into political leverage. In the run-up to the elections, it has used energy deliveries, infrastructure contracts, and cross-border trade concessions as tools to consolidate social and political goodwill among key Iraqi constituencies. Yet, as international sanctions continue to constrict Iran’s access to global markets, Iraq has assumed an even greater role as Tehran’s economic lifeline, both as a revenue source and as a conduit for sanctioned goods and financial transactions.

The Stakes for Stability

The November 2025 elections arrive at a pivotal juncture for Iraq. Under Prime Minister al-Sudani’s leadership since 2022, the country has attained unprecedented political stability and economic vitality not witnessed in over a decade. Substantial achievements across key areas –including the resolution of fiscal disagreements with the Kurdistan Regional Government, implementation of the Development Road Project to bolster regional connectivity, expanded ties with Türkiye, landmark security accords targeting the PKK, and reinforced partnerships with Washington and Gulf states– indicate that Iraq may be emerging from its prolonged post-invasion turbulence. This positive trajectory advances not only Iraq's national objectives but also reinforces the broader framework of regional stability and economic integration.

Iran's approach to Iraq, however, remains fundamentally rooted in safeguarding its strategic interests. Some of the core elements of Baghdad's recent diplomatic and development endeavors can potentially conflict with Tehran's regional calculus. Further, Iraq's deepening cooperation with Western and Gulf partners directly challenges Iranian influence. Nevertheless, Tehran has largely adopted a measured response, forgoing overt coercion in favor of more nuanced instruments including economic interdependence, religious networks, and security proxies.

In sum, the November elections will ultimately determine whether Iran can maintain significant influence in Iraq or whether its regional strategy will experience another substantial setback. For Tehran, this contest transcends the makeup of Iraq's next government and represents a critical test for the durability of Iran's regional strategy amid intensifying economic pressures, strategic isolation, and the weakening of its longstanding alliances.