The twelve-day conflict between Iran and Israel, which unfolded from June 13 to 24, may ultimately prove to be more than a fleeting military skirmish. It marks a potential inflection point in Iran’s national security doctrine –most notably in its longstanding conception of threat. For decades, the Islamic Republic has viewed its primary vulnerabilities as internal: preserving regime stability, containing ethnic separatism, and forestalling popular unrest that might spiral into counter-revolution. External threats, while not ignored, were typically understood as secondary factors that could exacerbate domestic fissures rather than supplant them. But this brief, high-intensity confrontation with Israel has unsettled that calculus. It may now compel Tehran to rethink its strategic priorities and elevate the salience of external military threats in a way not seen since the formative years of the Islamic Republic.

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s security architecture has been fundamentally shaped by the imperative to preempt domestic instability. Kurdish, Arab, and Baloch separatist movements have long been viewed as existential threats to the country’s territorial integrity, while large-scale popular mobilization against the regime has been framed as the ultimate national security nightmare. Within this framework, external adversaries have been perceived as dangerous not primarily for their military capabilities, but for their potential to inflame internal unrest. Consequently, Iran’s military and intelligence apparatus has been calibrated not merely to repel foreign attacks, but to contain and neutralize their anticipated domestic fallout.

Yet, despite the intensity and technological sophistication of Israel’s strikes, the long-feared domestic chain reactions failed to materialize. No popular uprising erupted, nor did mass protests take to the streets –defying long-standing assumptions. Perhaps most notably, ethnic minorities and separatist groups –often viewed as potential flashpoints– remained conspicuously passive. The widely held assumption that external aggression would automatically ignite Iran’s internal fault lines was decisively undermined. Instead, the crisis produced a rare moment of national cohesion, as public sentiment rallied around the defense of territorial integrity and the imperative of preserving unity in the face of foreign attack.

This outcome has laid bare the fragility of two longstanding assumptions at the heart of Iran’s threat calculus: first, that foreign aggression would inevitably spark anti-regime unrest; and second, that ethnic minorities would exploit such moments to advance separatist agendas. The absence of either dynamic during this crisis suggests that Iran’s traditional framework for defining and prioritizing threats is no longer fit for purpose –and may be overdue for a fundamental reassessment.

Beyond prompting internal recalibration, the conflict exposed critical vulnerabilities in Iran’s conventional military capabilities. Despite years of investment in missile development and asymmetric warfare doctrines, Israel’s precision-guided munitions and unmanned aerial systems (UAS) penetrated Iranian air defenses with unsettling ease. The failure to protect key strategic infrastructure from these strikes has underscored the structural inadequacies of Iran’s defense architecture in the face of modern, high-tech warfare.

Equally concerning were the espionage operations that bookended the Israeli strikes. Intelligence leaks, acts of sabotage against critical infrastructure, and coordinated cyber intrusions revealed systemic flaws in Iran’s counterintelligence and internal security apparatus. These breaches suggest that while the Islamic Republic has long prioritized the containment of grassroots dissent, it may now be increasingly exposed to sophisticated external operations aimed at the core of its security architecture.

In this light, the aftermath of the 12-day conflict compels a fundamental reordering of Iran’s threat priorities. Rather than fixating on hypothetical scenarios of internal collapse, Iran’s security establishment must pivot toward addressing tangible external threats –especially those that have laid bare its technological lag and intelligence vulnerabilities. Upgrading air defense systems, enhancing cyber capabilities, and modernizing conventional deterrents are no longer optional refinements; they constitute a strategic imperative for preserving national security in an increasingly high-tech battlespace.

At the same time, easing the regime’s reflexive securitization of ethnic minorities and embracing a more inclusive, participatory framework could prove far more effective for ensuring internal stability than continued repression. The national solidarity displayed during the 12-day conflict underscores a critical insight: Iran’s ethnic communities are not inherently subversive, but rather potential stakeholders in a shared vision of national security.

Nevertheless, such a shift will be far from straightforward. While the 12-day conflict may have created an opening for strategic introspection, it remains unclear whether Iran’s security elite and ruling establishment are willing –or institutionally capable– of seizing the moment. Should the lessons of this confrontation be disregarded and outdated doctrines left unchallenged, Iran risks compounding its vulnerabilities and facing even graver threats in the years ahead.

Indeed, one of the central drivers of this inertia may lie in the entrenched fear within Iran’s power structure: that abandoning its traditional security paradigm –rooted in regime preservation and the suppression of separatism– could inadvertently embolden the very forces it seeks to contain. This defensive mindset has contributed to a dangerous neglect of the country’s mounting military and intelligence vulnerabilities. By clinging to rigid ideological frameworks and inward-looking threat definitions, Tehran risks turning a blind eye to the evolving external challenges that now define the modern battlefield.

In this sense, any meaningful shift in Iran’s threat perception would carry implications far beyond the realm of policy. It would challenge the foundational logic of a security paradigm that has shaped the Islamic Republic since the early 1990s –one built on a dual strategy of domestic control and reliance on non-state armed proxies abroad. A redefinition of core threats would inevitably unsettle the institutional interests of Iran’s entrenched security elite and bureaucratic factions, many of whom have long profited –politically and materially– from the existing order.

Ultimately, if Iran is to emerge stronger and more secure, it must undertake a systemic recalibration of its security doctrine. Reassessing its threat priorities based on empirical realities –rather than entrenched ideological anxieties– could not only fortify national resilience but also open the door to greater regional cooperation, including with neighboring states and Western actors. The 12-day war may have ended, but its reverberations within Tehran’s strategic thinking are only beginning to unfold.